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ABSTRACT 
 
The United States Marine Corps contracted Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (BHTI) 
to develop and field new versions of the aging UH-1N and AH-1W helicopters.  As part 
of the development effort of the H-1 Upgrades, BHTI was tasked with development of a 
folding rotor system and the associated equipment necessary to support main rotor 
folding operations.  The blade fold equipment (BFE) was constrained throughout the 
development process by a list of conflicting requirements.  The requirements for 
commonality, versatility, simplicity, light weight, rapid application, and durability, while 
each was generally reasonable, could not be satisfied with one set of equipment.  The 
resulting BFE was ineffective for everyday use. 
The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the design requirements of the BFE, 
specifically the blade fold racks.  An investigation of the source of requirements was 
conducted, followed by interviews with system experts and end users.  Additional data 
were gathered during the program-sponsored test events from January through May 2005. 
In order to develop a suitable and effective set of BFE, the H-1 Upgrades program 
should reduce the set of design requirements on the new blade fold racks, specifically: 
1. Modify the H-1 Upgrades aircraft to incorporate an automatic folding rotor 
system or a blade indexing motor. 
2. Redesign the blade fold racks for a reduced set of configurations and load 
conditions. 
3. Consider a simple, one piece, clamping blade fold rack. 
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PREFACE 
 
The majority of the information contained within this thesis was obtained during a 
support of the H-1 Upgrades Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development flight test 
phase at Patuxent River, Maryland.  The author’s participation in these flight and ground 
test events prompted this topic as one for possible further investigation.  The research, 
results and discussion, and conclusions and recommendations presented are solely the 
opinion of the author and should not be construed as an official position of the United 
States Department of Defense, The United States Marine Corps, The United States Navy, 
the Naval Air Systems Command, the Bell Helicopter Textron Corporation, or the 
University of Tennessee. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
OBJECTIVE 
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) contracted Bell Helicopter Textron 
Incorporated (BHTI) to develop and field an upgrade to the existing UH-1N Huey and 
AH-1W Cobra helicopters.  The program, called “H-1 Upgrades”, was responsible for 
engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) of the UH-1Y “Iroquios” and AH-
1Z “Super Cobra” helicopters.  The new helicopters featured many upgrades to the 
existing design, including replacement of the old two-blade main rotor system with a 
more advanced four-blade design.  In order to minimize the aircraft footprint main rotor 
folding was required, which as a minimum had to fold two opposing blades of the four-
bladed rotor.  As such, the H-1 Upgrades program and BHTI were tasked with 
developing the support equipment (SE) and procedures for folding the new rotor design. 
One of the critical items of SE developed under the H-1 Upgrades program was 
the helicopter blade fold rack (BFR).  The BFRs were required to solve a complex 
problem, which was to facilitate a simple, effective blade folding process.  The purpose 
of this thesis was to evaluate the design requirements of the H-1 Upgrades helicopter 
blade fold racks. 
BACKGROUND 
The majority of the evaluation and data collection cited herein took place between 
2003 and 2005 at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland (NAS Pax River).  In 
2006, the H-1 Upgrades program proceeded to Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL), which 
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has not yet been completed.  Upon completion of OPEVAL, a formal report of all areas 
of suitability and effectiveness will be released from the operational testers to the Naval 
acquisition community.  The OPEVAL report should provide final resolution as to the 
effectiveness and suitability of the blade fold system as a long-term solution for use by 
the fleet. 
The blade fold racks went through several design iterations, described later.  At 
the time of this report, “BFR 4 and BFR 5” were the current, most recent BFRs, and were 
being evaluated in OPEVAL.  BFR 4 and BFR 5 are referred to as the “current” or “most 
recent” designs throughout this report. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
As part of the H-1 Upgrades development effort, BHTI was tasked to develop the 
support equipment necessary for folding the main rotor blades.  The blade fold support 
equipment was required to meet a host of conflicting requirements: for example, the racks 
had to be strong enough to withstand the force of a 100 kt wind on the main rotor blades 
but light enough for one man to lift and install.  The equipment had to be simple in design 
and easy to use, but had to support three separate configurations, had to be common to 
two different aircraft, and had to have multiple moving parts to accommodate the aircraft 
design.  These conflicting requirements presented designers with an insurmountable 
problem; there was no practical solution that could meet all the design requirements, 
which is shown later in this paper. 
Another problem with the program approach to the BFR design was that no 
dedicated testing or evaluation of the racks was performed.  No test plan was written, and 
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no report was prepared.  This SE will have a major impact on the operational efficiency 
of the final, fielded aircraft, and should have earned a dedicated evaluation period, early 
in the flight test program.  This thesis will evaluate the design requirements of the BFRs 
and recommend changes to that set of requirements that would result in a more successful 
BFR design. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE H-1 UPGRADES AIRCRAFT 
AH-1Z SUPER COBRA 
The AH-1Z Super Cobra was a tandem two-seat attack helicopter with a 4-bladed 
single main rotor and an anti-torque tail rotor, powered by two T700-GE-401 turbo-shaft 
engines.  The AH-1Z was an upgrade from the AH-1W, which included the following 
modifications:  a bearingless rigid main rotor head with composite rotor blades and a 
blade-fold system; a new main transmission and a new auxiliary power unit; a new tail 
rotor system, a new target sight system, and larger wings for increased weapons carriage.  
In addition, the AH-1Z was equipped with a new integrated cockpit that included 
upgrades to the communication, navigation, and electronic warfare systems as well as an 
integrated helmet mounted display system.  The AH-1Z was also equipped with a four-
axis stabilization and control augmentation system.  The overall aircraft length with 
rotors turning was approximately 58 feet, the height to the top of the main rotor hub was 
13 feet 2 inches, and the skid width was approximately 7 ft.  The maximum design gross 
weight of the aircraft was 18,500 pounds with specification mission gross weights 
ranging from 17,065 to 17,867 pounds.  A complete description of the AH-1Z test aircraft 
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is contained in references  1 and  2.  One of the test aircraft, Bu No. 166479, is pictured in 
Figure 1. 
UH-1Y IROQUOIS 
The UH-1Y Iroquois was a dual piloted utility helicopter with a 4-bladed single 
main rotor and an anti-torque tail rotor, powered by two T700-GE-401C turbo-shaft 
engines.  The drive system of the UH-1Y was identical to the AH-1Z, which included the 
main rotor, transmission, tail rotor drive system, and tail boom.  The UH-1Y also had a 
new fuel system with 380 gallons of internal fuel, provisions for 10 newly developed 
crashworthy troops seats, and a permanent fast rope installation.  In addition, the UH-1Y 
was equipped with a new integrated cockpit that included upgrades to the 
communication, navigation, and electronic warfare systems. The UH-1Y also had a four 
axis stability and control augmentation system.  The UH-1Y length with rotors turning 
was approximately 58 feet, and the height to the top of the main rotor hub was 13 feet 3 
inches.  Maximum gross weight, jacking weight, and towing weight was 18,500 pounds.  
Specification mission takeoff gross weights for the UH-1Y ranged from 17,603 pounds to 
18,098 pounds.  A complete description of the UH-1Y aircraft is contained references  1 
and  3.  One of the test aircraft, Bu No. 166476, is pictured in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 1:  AH-1Z SUPER COBRA 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2:  UH-1Y IROQUOIS 
Photo by Troy Lancaster, H-1 Upgrades
Photo by Troy Lancaster, H-1 Upgrades
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DESCRIPTION OF BLADE FOLD SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 
GENERAL 
 
The H-1 Upgrades aircraft utilized the same main rotor system on both aircraft 
types.  The main rotor system was designed to fold in order to save space on the flight 
and hangar decks aboard ship, and in order to be quickly deployable after air transport 
within a C-17 or other large cargo aircraft.  However, in order to save weight, cost, and 
complexity, the program office and BHTI decided very early in the development program 
not to incorporate an automatically folding rotor system.  Most ship-based helicopters at 
the time were using an automatic folding rotor system.  This would prove to be a driving 
decision later in the program.  Instead of an automatic folding system, a manual folding 
main rotor system with electric assist was designed and implemented.  The electric assist 
consisted of two parts; a flight control indicator on the cockpit display, to assist the 
operator in correctly placing the cyclic stick for folding; and an electric blade pin pulling 
motor.  All movement, folding, and securing of the rotor blades was manual. 
The main rotor had four blades, and each was marked with a color for recognition.  
The blue and red blades were the two folding blades, opposite each other on the rotor 
system, and were equipped with the electric pin pulling motors.  Each main rotor blade 
consisted of an inboard cuff section and an outboard blade.  The motors and pins were 
located at the junction of the blade to the cuff.  This junction can be seen in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 as the enlarged area at roughly 25% span from rotor hub to blade tip.  The 
orange and green blades were the non-folding blades and manual removal of the blade 
pin was required in the event that these blades were to be folded or removed. 
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The blade fold support equipment for one aircraft consisted of three main parts:  
two BFRs, two rotor brake locking tools, and the blade support pole.  All three segments 
were required to support one folding evolution on one aircraft, as well as some additional 
equipment and tools.  The equipment is described in the following paragraphs. 
 
BLADE FOLD RACKS 
The BFRs consisted of a large “strongback” frame with a blade securing jaw that 
attached at the top.  One BFR was to be pinned in place on the aircraft nose and another 
on the tail boom, and once the rotor blades were indexed into the jaws atop the BFRs, the 
jaws were locked down, securing the blades.  Longitudinal stability of the racks was 
provided by an angle brace that pinned in place farther inboard on the nose or tail boom.  
In addition, a second blade securing jaw could be pinned in place to provide a locking 
jaw for each of the remaining two blades, if desired.  See Figure 3 for a graphical 
representation of the strongback with both attached blade securing jaws. 
As a result of the nature of the rotor design and the folding mechanism, the 
folding blades had to slide through the jaws as the rotor was indexed.  The blade (one 
front and one back) slid across the trailing edge roller, which also served to hold the rotor 
blade in the rack.  The roller also provided the folding moment on the blade and as the 
blade folded, the roller aligned the blades in pairs, two forward and two aft.  As a result 
of the need for the blade to slide, the blade jaws had delryn pads placed on the upper and 
lower surfaces, to reduce friction and to avoid damage to the blade. 
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FIGURE 3:  BLADE FOLD RACK 
 
In order to reduce the force required throughout the blade fold evolution, the racks 
provided a jacking mechanism to lift the blades prior to unpinning and folding the main 
rotor.  The jacking was provided by a coarse threaded shaft, which was actuated using a 
speed wrench in a standard ½” square drive at the base of the BFR.  Late in the design 
cycle, a clip was added to secure the speed wrench to the BFR, for convenience. 
The second blade securing jaw was used in the heavy weather configuration, and 
was similar to the first in method of operation.  It could be pinned in place after the 
strongback and first jaws were already installed.  Three pin locations were required, two 
on the vertical support and one on the other side of the strongback, at the base of the 
jacking pole.  The heavy weather rack did not provide jacking; the blade had to be lifted 
Blue/Red blade clamp 
Green/Orange blade clamp 
(heavy weather only) 
Aircraft attachment 
points 
Jacking pole 
Trailing edge  
roller 
Hinge Locations 
Speed Handle 
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slightly to install the jaw.  Once in place and supporting the blade, the arm across the top 
of the heavy weather rack was pinned in place. 
 
ROTOR BRAKE LOCKING TOOLS 
The H-1 Upgrades aircraft were each provided with a rotor brake, but the rotor 
brake would not maintain hydraulic pressure when the aircraft was off, and so it did not 
provide a reliable means of securing the main rotor against rotational freeplay, or chatter.  
As a result, a rotor brake locking tool (RBLT) was developed.  Two RBLTs were 
required to properly secure the main rotor, one to restrain the main rotor from rotational 
movement in each direction.  The RBLTs were bolted to the rotor brake discs inside the 
aircraft panels, and locked the main rotor by securing the brake disc from freeplay. 
 
BLADE SUPPORT POLE 
In order to ensure that the rotor blades engaged smoothly into the BFRs, a blade 
support pole, or “crutch pole” was provided.  This allowed a crewmember to hold the tip 
of the blade while standing on the ground, to minimize vertical flapping of the blade and 
the risk of damage to the blade.   The crutch pole was approximately 8 feet long and was 
designed to slide over the tip of the rotor blade.  Later in the design and test process, a net 
was added to the crutch pole to keep it from sliding too far onto the rotor blade, which 
could result in damage to the main rotor trim tab.  Also, a second, longer pole (17 feet 
long) was later added to allow a second crewmember to push or pull on the main rotor 
blade from the ground. 
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ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT 
In the normal configuration, the folding blade was secured in the BFR while the 
non-folding blade was strapped to the BFR.  The strap was applied by throwing a leader 
over the rotor blade and pulling the strap across.  The leader was weighted with lead shot 
sewn into the material at the end of the leader.  Once in place, the strap was pinned below 
the blade on the BFR.  This provided enough downward force to minimize blade flapping 
in windy conditions and to keep the restrained blade from contacting the BFR in 
moderate weather and wind conditions. 
When the rotor blades were not folded, the rotor tips were secured using a “sack” 
that slipped over the rotor tip and was tied back to the skids.  Each rotor blade had one tip 
sock.  This configuration was used in benign weather and wind conditions for short-term 
storage of the aircraft in the fully spread condition. 
 
SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS 
Normal Weather 
The blade fold support equipment was designed to work with several 
configurations.  The first, and most common configuration was the “normal weather” 
configuration.  This was the fastest folded condition to apply and was versatile enough to 
suffice in nearly all weather conditions.  In the normal weather configuration, the blue 
and red blades are folded and secured in the BFRs, while the orange and green blades 
remain unfolded and are secured by a large nylon strap to the BFR.  The normal weather 
configuration was designed to restrain the rotor in winds up to 60 knots in any direction, 
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FIGURE 4:  AH-1Z IN THE NORMAL WEATHER CONFIGURATION 
 
as well as during aircraft movement and elevator operations.  The straps, used only in the 
normal weather configuration, were yellow, and are shown in Figure 4. 
Heavy Weather 
The other configuration often used was the heavy weather configuration.  In the 
heavy weather configuration, the blue and red blades are folded and secured by the BFRs, 
as in the normal weather configuration, but the orange and green blades are also secured 
by the secondary racks of the BFRs, which had to be added to the strongback.  The 
orange and green blades remained unfolded and aligned fore and aft.  This configuration 
of the SE was designed to withstand winds up to 100 knots in any direction.  This 
required that in the heavy weather configuration, all four main rotor blades were secured 
by locking jaws on a rigid metal frame.  In Figure 5, the heavy weather racks can be seen 
securing the unfolded blades of the main rotor.  Because the heavy weather jaws were not  
Photo by Troy Lancaster, H-1 Upgrades
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FIGURE 5:  UH-1Y IN THE HEAVY WEATHER CONFIGURATION 
 
provided jacking, the orange and green blades had to be lifted into place using the blade 
support pole.  The heavy weather jaws are the lower rack on both the front and rear BFR. 
 
Air Transportability 
The final configuration of the blade fold support equipment was the air 
transportability configuration, in which all four blades are folded and secured by the 
BFRs.  This configuration is similar to the heavy weather configuration, except that the 
remaining two blades are folded in order to further reduce the overall width of the folded 
aircraft. The same BFR hardware was employed as in the heavy weather configuration, 
and the same basic rack as the normal weather configuration.  Folding of the two 
additional blades required manual removal of the blade restraining pins on the green and 
orange blades, because only the red and blue blades were equipped with pin-pulling 
motors, so it was a labor-intensive process and was not often utilized.  In the air 
transportability configuration, the system was designed to withstand large vertical,  
Photo by Matthew Funk, H-1 Upgrades 
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FIGURE 6:  AH-1Z IN THE AIR TRANSPORTABILITY CONFIGURATION 
 
lateral, and longitudinal forces, as well as vibrations, but not high wind and weather 
loads.  Figure 6 shows the air transportability configuration (reference   15). 
 
H-1 UPGRADES MAIN ROTOR FOLDING PROCEDURE 
The first step in the main rotor folding procedure was to position the main rotor 
swash plate for the fold.  This was accomplished on hydraulic power, by positioning the 
pilot’s cyclic stick in a location indicated by the pilot display panel.  Once in place, the 
cyclic was pinned at its base and hydraulic power was secured.  The main rotor blades 
were pre-positioned with the red and blue blades in the front right and back left 
quadrants.  Next, the BFRs were assembled and installed on the aircraft.  The rack on the 
aircraft nose was pinned at its base and raised into position, and the angle brace was 
added last.  On the aft rack, the angle brace and one of the base pins, both on the same 
side of the aircraft, were secured.  The BFR was then rotated in to position and the 
Figure from reference  15 
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second base pin was installed.  Once the main rotor was in position and the BFRs were in 
place, two of the main rotor blades (the red and blue blades) were positioned into the fold 
racks, and the jacking pole was used to raise the red and blue blades into position for the 
fold.  Jacking was provided to relieve stress on the attachment points, and was 
accomplished by hand, using a ratchet-style driving handle, or speed handle.  The rotor-
mounted electric motors would then pull one of the two blade retaining pins on each of 
the secured blades, leaving the red and blue blades attached by one pin each.  The 
remaining pin served as the pivot point for folding the blade.  In the original design, the 
main rotor would then be indexed clockwise (counter-rotation) by manually turning the 
tail rotor, while the folding blades remained secured by the racks, forcing the blades to 
fold about the remaining blade retaining pin.  See Figure 7 and Figure 8 for a graphical 
representation of the fold sequence. 
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FIGURE 7:  BLADE FOLD SEQUENCE 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8:  BLADE FOLD PROCESS 
 
Front BFR
Aft BFR
Photo by Troy Lancaster, H-1 Upgrades
Figure sourced from BHTI, 
modified by Matthew Funk 
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CHAPTER 2: CONFLICTING DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
 
The design requirements of the blade fold support equipment were overwhelming.  
The system was supposed to be functional in the normal weather, the heavy weather, and 
the air transportability configurations, in all weather states, in all loading conditions, and 
durable enough to last the life of the aircraft in highly corrosive and harsh environments.  
It was to require minimal manpower for installation and removal, and yet had to be 
installed and removed very quickly to support a high operational tempo.  It had to be 
lightweight yet extremely strong, simple yet durable, and secure yet adaptable. 
 
VERSATILITY 
The blade fold system was required to be extremely versatile.  It had to support 
the normal weather, heavy weather, and air transportability configurations of two 
different aircraft.  It had to allow the blades to be jacked up during the fold sequence and 
had to allow the folding blade to slide through the BFR as the rotor was indexed into 
position.  The racks had to be simple enough for rapid installation but complex enough to 
support a dynamic process in three folded configurations on two aircraft.  This alone was 
enough to require a complex piece of machinery. 
 
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 
The blade fold system also had to withstand significant axial loads, due to wind, 
vibration, and normal load factors applied to the blades.  The heavy weather 
configuration had to use the same base unit as the normal weather configuration for 
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simplicity, but also had to withstand 100 kt winds from any direction.  The forces that 
result from 100 knots of wind across the two main rotor blades were astounding – 1074 lb 
in the vertical axis and 223 lb horizontal ( 15).  The same rack had to withstand 
longitudinal and lateral loadings, as well as a +4.5 to -2.0 g vertical load factor and ±3.0 g 
horizontal load factor during air transportability, which resulted in up to 1,918 lb applied 
at one of the tailboom attachment fittings ( 15).  The unnecessarily excessive structural 
strength requirements resulted in an over-designed and heavy BFR.   
 
EASE OF USE 
The racks were required to be single man portable, which meant that they were 
supposed to weigh less than 50 pounds per piece of equipment.  The number of pieces 
had to be kept to a minimum to ensure rapid installation and to minimize the aircraft 
specific tools and support equipment requirements.  The racks had to provide ample grip 
to be installed at night and in the rain and winds, and they had to be very clearly marked 
for the same reasons.  The racks were to be designed so as to minimize the number of 
flight deck crewmembers that were required for installation.  They needed to be installed 
from ground level, to minimize risk of injury to personnel and also to speed the process 
of installation.  For ease of use, the BFRs needed to be simple, clearly marked, and user-
friendly.  Unfortunately, this was quite difficult, given the complexity that was required 
by the requirement for versatility. 
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AIRCRAFT INTERFACE 
The blade fold racks had a pre-determined aircraft interface, because the aircraft 
design was finalized.  There were three attachment points available for each rack, two 
directly under the rack and one closer to the aircraft center for the angle brace.  The 
limited freedom of aircraft interface limited the design of the racks.  The installation 
procedures had to be simple for speed and ease of use.  The racks were not to interfere 
with aircraft equipment or procedures, and needed to minimize the risk of inadvertent 
damage to the aircraft.  The racks needed to be gentle on the rotor blades, and yet had to 
secure them in extreme conditions and loading.  The nature of the fold procedure required 
that the blades be able to slide through the rack during the fold process.  This was 
possibly the most significant hurdle to overcome, because it was nearly impossible to 
design a rack that held the blades securely in a variety of conditions, yet still allowed 
them to slide freely during the process. 
 
SHIP INTERFACE 
The blade fold racks were required to be stored on the ship, and because interior 
storage is of such high value, the racks will inevitably spend a lot of time outside in the 
salt-water environment.  The racks needed to minimize the required storage and logistical 
footprint, as well as the amount of new or specific tools required.  The racks needed to be 
easily pre-staged for aircraft before arrival, and they needed to utilize a safe installation 
procedure.  The racks needed to be quickly and easily moveable in order to facilitate 
aircraft movement on the flight deck.  The ship interface requirements demanded a 
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simple, robust design that was small and durable.  This conflicted with other 
requirements that drove a more complex, bulky design. 
 
ENVIRONMENTS 
The racks were required to withstand prolonged use in a military environment by 
the USMC, in all deployment areas.  The required environments included desert, at sea, 
mountains, and arctic locations.  The racks were not provided storage crates and so they 
would be subject to the ambient environment at all times.  The marines found that the 
best place for storage of the racks aboard ship was in the unoccupied aircraft parking 
spot.  This requires the racks to be chained down to the abrasive flight deck and subject to 
wind, sun, rain, and sea spray at all times.  The racks had to have minimal maintenance, 
and yet they had moving components that must be reliable.  They were also so big that 
the racks had to be pre-staged before aircraft arrival at an operational area; they were too 
big to be carried inside the aircraft.  This is a significant logistical impact on military 
operations and supportability of the H-1 Upgrades aircraft because it meant that another 
aircraft or vehicle must move the support equipment to the desired aircraft location, 
before the aircraft can deploy to that location.  This required that the racks be extremely 
robust to tolerate the harsh environments, which was in direct conflict with the 
requirements for moving parts and multiple configurations, which require maintenance to 
ensure reliability. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY  
 
INADEQUATE EVALUATION 
One of the complicating factors throughout the H-1 Upgrades program was the 
fact that the BFRs were never fully evaluated.  Throughout the flight test program, no 
dedicated set of tests was conducted with the goal of fully evaluating the BFRs.  A small 
set of testing was conducted under the “Force to Fold” investigation described later in 
this paper.  Several modifications to the aircraft and BFR were considered and briefly 
evaluated, but only with the objective of reducing the force required to fold; this 
investigation did not address the adequacy of the BFRs to support day-to-day fleet 
operations.  The racks were evaluated partially during crew proficiency training prior to 
the initial shipboard tests of the aircraft, or “Sea Trials”, but by that time the program was 
in its final phases of aircraft evaluation, and the purpose of the exercise was crew training 
on the current system, not evaluation and improvement of the system.   
The racks were never allocated a dedicated evaluation with trained test personnel 
that would have given credibility and significance to the evaluation.  No cognizant test 
engineer/system expert was assigned or tasked with evaluation of the racks, which would 
have resulted in recommendations to the program office to correct the deficiencies.  
There was no evaluation performed by trained test pilots or test engineers, because the 
only crew qualified for installation of the racks onto the aircraft was the Marine 
maintenance crew.  This meant that all evaluations were performed by non-test personnel.  
No rating scale could be applied to the task, so very little quantitative data could be 
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compiled.  Data gathering was performed by observation and by interviews of users’ likes 
and dislikes of the system. 
Significant use data and user comments were attained during Sea Trials.  This 
evaluation included a four-hour meeting in which the operational users of the equipment 
spoke to the author (Sea Trials lead) and the BFR designer, during which time the users 
listed all deficiencies and shortcomings of the existing equipment.  Again, all comments 
were subjective opinions of the maintenance crew, and not quantified by a rating scale, 
test instrument, or formal evaluation training.  However, these were experienced users 
familiar with a wide range of support equipment throughout the Navy/Marine Corps fleet.  
The list of shortcoming is included in the appendix of this report. 
INTERVIEWS 
Several interviews were conducted, which are referenced in the “Works 
Consulted” of this paper.  The litany of design requirements became apparent during an 
interview with Mr. Mike Southerland, the designer of the final BFR, during Sea Trials in 
May 2005.  The primary research interview was with Mr. Jack Greely.  Mr. Greely was 
the SE lead for the H-1 Upgrades program, and has spent over 20 years working with 
support equipment, primarily for helicopter development programs.  Mr. Greely was a 
member of the H-1 Upgrades team for four years prior to the author’s involvement, and 
his extensive e-mail records and meeting notes were consulted, as well.  Additional 
interviews were conducted with H-1 pilots, ship deck handlers, and flight deck personnel. 
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ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
Additional research was also conducted to determine the source of the BFR 
design requirements.  The requirements for weather conditions first arrive in the program 
specifications (references  4 and  5), but it is unknown how or why they were added to the 
aircraft specifications.  There were no requirements for the implementation of the folding 
process, only that the main rotor was required to fold and could use a combination of 
automatic and manual means.  The implementation of the folding rotor was the result of a 
design trade study by Bell Helicopter, which was not releasable to the author. 
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CHAPTER 4: DESIGN ITERATIONS 
 
INITIAL DESIGN 
The initial design of the BFRs, shown in Figure 9, was created by Norco, Inc., and 
delivered in 2002.  The racks did not meet the majority of the users’ requirements and 
were too large and cumbersome for safe installation.  This failure was the first sign of 
difficulty in development of a satisfactory BFR.  The H-1 Upgrades team and BHTI 
collectively decided that not only were the racks too deficient for fielding, but that an 
entirely new design was required.  In addition, a “tiger team” was assembled of senior 
government and contractor personnel that determined that the best course of action was 
for Bell Aero, a division of BHTI, to build the racks.  Little space in this paper is devoted 
to the initial Norco design, because it was delivered and rejected before the author came 
aboard the program.  Nevertheless, it is notable that the first attempt to design a set of 
blade fold racks with the given design requirements was a complete failure, and 
modification was not feasible.  The first iteration was so bad that it was scrapped 
completely.  It is also notable that the original design is similar in form to the final BFE. 
SECOND DESIGN 
The second iteration, designed and build by Bell Aero, was much closer to the 
most recent design iteration than the original Norco racks.  The functionality was 
essentially the same as the most resent design, but additional effort was made to keep the 
racks as small and portable as possible.  This design iteration utilized a three-piece main 
rack for portability (strongback and two jaw assemblies), the jacking pole for relief of  
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FIGURE 9:  ORIGINAL BFR DESIGN 
 
stress on the restraining pins, and a roller design to allow the blades to translate 
longitudinally as they fold.  Users soon found that assembly of the strongback to the 
jacking pole was tedious, and were soon leaving the two pieces together as one assembly.  
The heavy weather assembly was added as needed.  The RBLT was also tedious to 
install, and users soon found that one RBLT was not enough; two were required. 
This design iteration got much closer to meeting the main requirements than 
before, but still fell significantly short.  The rack was too heavy, requiring a minimum of 
two marines to move each of the racks to the aircraft, plus one more if the heavy weather 
jaws were required.  The design required a man to climb aloft in heavy weather to secure 
the unfolded blades in the heavy weather configuration.  The strongback physically 
interfered with the target sight system on the AH-1Z.  It could also be dropped during 
Photo by Jack Greely, H-1 Upgrades 
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installation, resulting in damage to the expensive aircraft windscreen.  The racks were not 
marked for installation, making the process more difficult than was necessary.  The racks 
consisted of three separate parts that were to be pinned together after installation of the 
strongback.  These pins had to be accounted for at all times and the holes on mating 
pieces were difficult to line up during assembly, particularly at night.  The rotor brake 
locking tools, though functional, required removal of an aircraft panel for access to each 
of the rotor brake discs, and the panel could not be replaced once the RBLT was installed.  
In a long-term application, this would have allowed corrosion and foreign objects to get 
inside the aircraft structure and result in an undetermined amount of long-term damage.  
The RBLTs also required additional tools that were not in the current shipboard 
inventory, which was an additional logistical and supportability impact. 
 
BFR 4 AND BFR 5 
BFR 4 and BFR 5 were delivered in spring 2005 and still failed to meet the 
impossible set of requirements, though improvements had been made.  Design 
modifications had been made to address usability, things like markings for installation, 
grip tape, cables for the removable pins, and attachment points on the rack for storage of 
the BFR specific tools.  However, the racks were still too heavy for a single man to carry 
and install, they still required additional tooling, and they still presented a risk of damage 
to aircraft if they were not installed properly.  Mating parts were still difficult to pin 
together.  The racks still required that a man climb aloft to secure the heavy weather 
racks, and the installation procedure of the RBLTs was still cumbersome and clumsy. 
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BLADE FOLD FORCE INVESTIGATION 
During the build up to the program’s initial shipboard suitability tests (sea trials), 
many blade folding evolutions were performed for proficiency of the deck crew and to 
ensure that the aircraft and equipment was robust.  Throughout these evolutions, the tail 
rotor was being hand-turned to index the main rotor, and it became apparent that the 
forces applied to the tail rotor were possibly damaging.  The BHTI rotor and drive 
systems group was asked what the limit of tail rotor applied force was, and they 
determined that in order to prevent damage to the tail rotor, the force applied at the tail 
rotor tip must be limited to 100 lbs.  A series of tests determined that the main rotor could 
not be reliably folded within the 100 lb force limitation.  This meant that the existing 
blade fold procedures were inadequate and could result in major damage to the aircraft if 
continued.  In addition, the test aircraft at this time were stored in hangars and not 
exposed to rain, dirt, or corrosion.  It was obvious that in a dirty or corrosive 
environment, the forces would increase as the moving parts corroded, which would 
subsequently increase the force required and risk of major aircraft damage in an 
operational environment.  Additional testing ensued, in an effort to find a way to 
minimize the amount of force required to fold the main rotor blades.  The following 
methods were attempted, but would ultimately fail to reduce the force to an acceptable 
level.  With each attempt, multiple folding and unfolding evolutions were conducted to 
determine the effect on the required force.  In most cases, the aircraft was flown between 
each fold cycle, to maintain more operationally representative data. 
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REDUCED TORQUE ON BLADE PINS 
The first suggestion by BHTI to reduce the blade folding force required was to 
reduce the applied torque on the blade retaining pins, which would have reduced the 
friction in the pivot joint.  A series of folding evolutions was conducted at multiple levels 
of reduced pin torque.  Each time, the pins were removed and re-installed at a new torque 
setting, at decreasing percentages of the original torque.  Some benefit was realized, but 
not enough to eliminate the risk to the tail rotor.  Moreover, this approach would have 
required a completely new set of development tests on the main rotor, resulting in 
significant schedule slip and funding required.  The long-term effects of reduced torque 
on rotor behavior and fatigue were unknown.  Reduced blade pin torque was not feasible 
and did not improve the problem. 
 
JACKING HEIGHT EFFECTS 
During discussions of the force to fold, it was noted that the jacking position of 
the main rotor blades for folding might not be the ideal position to minimize forces.  The 
procedure had always been to raise the jacking pole as high as it would go, but the height 
of the rack had been determined based on fatigue life of the pin pulling motor, and once a 
height was found that met the requirements, the “ideal” rotor blade height had never been 
determined.  In addition, during the rotor design, the blades had been predicted to 
statically droop less than they actually did, so the computer model of the rotor could not 
be used to determine the theoretical best location because it did not have an accurate 
representation of static rotor blade characteristics.  Subsequently, a six-inch extension to 
the jacking pole was created in order to evaluate the effects of jacking height.  Because 
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the movement of the jacking pole was greater than six inches, the extension allowed 
testers to evaluate any height from the full down position to six inches above the 
maximum height of the jacking pole.  Folding evolutions were conducted at various 
heights above and below the full extension height of the jacking pole, in approximately ½ 
inch increments.  Some improvement was realized when the height of the jacking pole 
was three rotations of the jacking handle below the full extension location, about one-half 
inch below full extension.  As in the case of the rotor pin torque investigation, this effect 
was insignificant in the overall force required to fold the blades and a full investigation of 
jacking effects was not completed.  Jacking height effects were not significant enough to 
correct the problem. 
 
LUBRICATION 
Another potential method of reducing the force required to fold was to lubricate 
the pivot location of the main rotor.  This method was attempted in conjunction with the 
investigation of reduced blade pin torque, in the hope that a reduction in torque with an 
applied lubricant may solve the problem.  Initially, in the hangar, lubrication seemed to 
reduce the required forces.  Unfortunately, the test team found that once the aircraft was 
released for flight, the lubrication attracted dirt and grime, resulting in an increase in 
force required to fold.  Once the rotor components were removed, cleaned, and 
reassembled without the lubricant, the force required returned to its original levels.  
Moreover, the application of lubricant would have been a new maintenance procedure 
that would have been required on every fold evolution, requiring additional man power 
for support, further increasing the time required to unfold and prep the aircraft for flight, 
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and adding a risky procedure that required a man to climb atop the aircraft during every 
fold operation.  Lubrication of the rotor parts increased required maintenance and 
contributed to the problem of excessive force required to fold the blades. 
 
SWASH PLATE RIGGING 
BHTI conducted an investigation of various main rotor swash plate positions in an 
attempt to reduce the force required to fold.  The BFRs were designed for the main rotor 
to be perpendicular to the rotor mast, in order to minimize torsion on the pivot point and 
vertical motion of the folding blades throughout the fold.  In the tested configuration, the 
pinning locations of the cyclic did not result in a perpendicular orientation of the rotor 
plane to the rotor mast.  The evaluation of swash plate position resulted in a significant 
reduction of force.  In the tested conditions the force required dropped from 135 lb 
required to 97 lb.  However, a change in the cyclic pinning positions would have required 
a flight control software change as well as a hardware change, and was deemed 
inappropriate for implementation prior to sea trials and OPEVAL.  In addition, a force 
required of 97 lb was not considered to be sufficiently low, because the team agreed that 
forces would climb in an operational environment, so forces in the hangar conditions 
needed to be consistently much lower than the 100 lb limit.  Swash plate rigging showed 
the most potential for at least partial correction of the excessive force requirement, but 
still did not make enough of an impact to solve the problem. 
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A FINAL ATTEMPT 
As a final attempt to mitigate the force to fold, Bell Aero sent the BFR designer to 
Pax River to modify the BFRs.  The blade contact points were modified with a larger, 
low friction, contact pad.  This would have reduced the secure attachment of the blade by 
the rack, because a soft neoprene-type compound was used for the blade contact patch.  
The roller was modified with a harder compound in an attempt to keep the rotor trailing 
edge from “digging in” to the roller.  The result of this evaluation was that, as with the 
investigation of lubricants, the force required to fold the rotor increased.  A small benefit 
was realized in certain circumstances, but in most evolutions, the force remained the 
same or was greater than before the modification.   
 
ADDITION OF BLADE HANDLING POLE 
Finally, after all the investigations of methods to reduce the force required to fold, 
BHTI and Bell Aero determined that there was no feasible way to consistently reduce the 
force to an acceptable level.  The only way to fold the blades, then, was by application of 
force directly to the main rotor blade instead of using the tail rotor.  Consideration was 
given to use of a rope tied to the top of the crutch pole, but during shipboard operations 
the rope handler would be at risk of falling overboard.  Deck handlers needed to be able 
to push on the blades during folding instead of pulling on it.  In order to accomplish this, 
another piece of support equipment was developed.  The blade handling pole was a 
seventeen-foot long metal pole that attached near top of the blade support pole.  This 
meant that two people were now required to support the main rotor blade, one on the 
support pole to limit the vertical deflection of the main rotor blade, and another on the 
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blade-handling pole applying the force.  In addition, while aboard ship, the blades on one 
side of the aircraft are not over the flight deck so application of force on the outboard 
blades was impossible.  The blade handling pole can be seen in use in Figure 10. 
The results of this approach were that 1) an additional piece of equipment was 
required to the already cumbersome list of equipment, 2) an additional person was 
required to complete the blade fold procedure, and 3) the risk of damage to the aircraft 
still existed, if a deck crewman attempted to index the main rotor using the tail rotor.  
This approach, while functional, was a work around at best.  It solved none of the 
problems and required a significant increase in effort and equipment.   
 
 
FIGURE 10:  BLADE SUPPORT POLE AND BLADE HANDLING POLE IN USE 
 
Photo by Troy Lancaster, H-1 Upgrades
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CHAPTER 5:  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The following results, discussion, and conclusions are the sole opinion of the 
author, based on his analysis of the program issues.  They do not represent the views or 
intentions of the H-1Upgrades program office or of BHTI.  The following paragraphs 
present an analysis of contributing factors that led ultimately to the development of BFE 
that were unsuitable for operational use, followed by a recommended set of design 
compromises.  Throughout the course of design iterations, no attempt was made to 
compromise design requirements in order to achieve success, and no effort was placed on 
investigation of possible aircraft modifications that could minimize the blade folding 
associated problems.  The only way to field a successful set of BFE was to limit the 
requirements of the equipment, so that a robust, lightweight, simple BFR could be 
fielded. 
 
USERS DISSATISFIED 
The true judge of the BFRs will ultimately be the end user, the USMC support 
crew that will use the equipment on a daily basis.  The Marines are known for finding a 
way to make something work.  Still, during the sea trials test period, the author hosted a 
meeting to discuss the feasibility of the BFR design as the long-term solution for fleet 
use.  The result of two hours of discussion was a list of 23 deficiencies and issues with 
the design.  The marines felt that the BFRs were completely inadequate for fleet 
introduction.  Some of the noted deficiencies of the tested design are listed below: 
1. Inadequate blade protection on the forward and aft heavy weather rack. 
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2. Interference of the jacking pole with the heavy weather rack blade attachment. 
3. Inadequate handles on the blade handling pole. 
The full list of noted blade fold SE issues can be found in the appendix of this 
paper.  These noted deficiencies are significant in nature and are spread across all aspects 
of the BFE.  The marines who were aboard the ship during sea trials and participated in 
this meeting were part of the operational test squadron that would provide the final 
evaluation of the aircraft.  Nine months later, when the aircraft entered OPEVAL and was 
turned over to these same marines, the BFE remained unchanged.  Although the 
OPEVAL report is not yet released, it is reasonable to conclude that the same Marines 
will still consider the BFRs inadequate. 
 
COMPROMISE 
The history of the BFE has been one of compromise.  The initial decision to 
design a manual folding system was a compromise against cost.  The design requirement 
to support multiple configurations and all weather conditions was a compromise of 
commonality and simplicity in support equipment requirements.  The system restraints 
are summarized well in reference  8, which was a trip report by the BFR designer 
following the final attempt to modify the BFE.  The purpose of this trip and BFR 
modification was to determine the feasibility of multiple options for reduction in the 
force required to fold the H-1 Upgrades aircraft, prior to the sea trials test period.  As 
previously noted, the trip was not successful and led to the development of the blade 
handling pole as a work around solution.  The summary is below: 
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“The H-1 upgrade Aircraft are required to fold with only powered Pin 
Pullers. Other fleet Aircraft employ Rotor Phasing, Pitch Lock, and 
Blade Sweep actuators.  In addition, H-1 upgrade heavy weather 
requirements are to restrain Blades without damage in 100 kt 
conditions.  Existing fleet Aircraft fold racks restrain only 60 kt winds. 
H-1 upgrade Racks are designed to maximize commonality- one Rack 
set will fold both Cobra and Huey Aircraft, for both shipboard use and 
C-5 transportability. These requirements force a heavy and complex 
Rack System, while maximizing Aircraft performance and reliability, 
and minimizing procurement and direct operating costs.” 
 
PRIORITIES 
One of the main problems with the blade fold support equipment was the 
approach that had been taken by the program.  Because of the cost and magnitude of 
design changes to the aircraft, there was strong reluctance to correct blade folding 
problems by a change to the aircraft design, but there was no way to address the problem 
through changes in the support equipment.  There were simply too many requirements for 
the SE to meet; it was impossible for the SE to correct deficiencies to the aircraft and 
rotor system design.  Throughout the program, it was always too expensive and would 
have taken too long to correctly address the aircraft deficiencies.  The program charter 
was primarily development of a flight vehicle, and the BFRs were considered a 
supportability issue, not a flight issue. This belief was so pervasive that no study was 
conducted to evaluate the feasibility and cost of implementation of an automatic folding 
rotor; the option was eliminated without in-depth consideration. 
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COST AND SCHEDULE 
Another issue that inhibited correction of the problem was that the program was 
continually under schedule and budget pressure.  The general attitude was that the 
program had to go forward because the end user, the USMC, needed the upgraded 
aircraft, and they needed it “now”.  And it was true.  The USMC did need the aircraft, 
and the program was under very high pressure from high-ranking officials in the 
government, military, and BHTI.  The program was already significantly over budget as a 
result of schedule slip to more than twice the original planned timeline for aircraft 
development.  As a result, anything that was considered to be manageable was generally 
ignored in favor of higher priority problems.  The H-1 Upgrades program was at risk of 
cancellation, which would have denied the marines of this much needed capability 
upgrade.  This manifested itself on a smaller scale, because the program had to keep 
“moving forward” in order to avoid the appearance of a program that couldn’t be fixed, 
and must be cancelled.  This meant that interim milestones had to be met on schedule, 
and in the case of sea trials, it meant performing the final evaluation on a blade fold 
system that, in the opinion of the users, was not ready for fleet use.  Finally, when BHTI 
implemented the blade handling pole, they assured the program office that this solution 
was “just for OPEVAL” and that a new design would be delivered after OPEVAL.  At 
the time of publishing this paper, no new support has been developed, tested, or 
delivered. 
 
 36 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
REDUCED LOAD CONDITIONS 
One way to improve on the BFE would be to redesign the equipment with fewer 
design requirements and more freedoms of design.  If the BFRs did not have to withstand 
a 1.5g lateral loading in the air transportability configuration, the racks could have been 
smaller and lighter.  A separate set of equipment could have been added for the rarely 
used configuration of air transportability.   
Another way to reduce required load conditions was to support only one set of 
weather conditions.  The MH-60S aircraft utilizes an automatically folding rotor system 
with small, lightweight blade support racks that are designed for use in winds up to 60 
kts.  For more extreme weather conditions, the aircraft must be stored in the hangar.  If 
one weather configuration had been chosen for the H-1 Upgrades, the racks would not 
have been required to have a separate heavy weather rack that pinned in place; instead, 
the entire rack system could have been a one piece design that was suitable for all 
planned conditions.   
Still another way to reduce the complexity of the BFR design was to design a 
more robust main rotor, so that the folding blades could be placed in the racks after 
folding rather than before.  This way, the blades would not have to be allowed to move 
through the racks during the fold cycle, allowing for a simple, secure blade restraint.  
This too would be similar to H-60 series helicopters, in that the racks are placed on the 
rotor system after the fold cycle is complete, so that once placed in the racks, the blades 
never move.  This change to the H-1 Upgrades would also alleviate the risk of damage to 
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the tail rotor by eliminating the high force required to fold.  Finally, this would have 
greatly reduced the complexity of the BFR by eliminating the need for both jacking and 
sliding of the rotor blade.  The racks could have been a simple clamp design to secure the 
blade, rather than a complicated pad and roller system.   It is possible that there would 
have to be operational restrictions on the new BFRs if they were designed to a smaller 
load set, but this is a trade study that never took place to determine the operational 
feasibility of such a set of limits.  The reduction in weather configurations could have 
greatly reduced the complexity and increased reliability of the BFRs by elimination of the 
moving parts on the system. 
REDUCED CONFIGURATIONS 
One more way to improve the functionality of the BFE would have been to limit 
the number of configurations that one set of equipment needs to meet.  For example, if 
the racks were designed to support both aircraft type in only the normal weather 
configuration, savings could be realized in weight, complexity, and ease of installation.  
There is an obvious benefit to using the same set of BFRs for both the UH-1Y and the 
AH-1Z, but there is limited gain by using the same set of equipment for the air 
transportability configuration as in the heavy weather configuration.  If the racks were not 
the same set of equipment that is used for air transportability and heavy weather, the 
resultant loads on the rack would be much less, resulting in a smaller and lighter BFR.  
Also, the number of parts and complexity of installation could have been greatly reduced, 
making the racks simpler, more robust, and more reliable. 
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SIMPLIFIED DESIGN 
Another way to minimize the BFE requirements list would be to simplify the 
design.  Specifically, the heavy weather configuration could utilize all the same 
equipment as the normal weather configuration, including the large yellow blade securing 
strap, but could also implement a second, vertical brace that would attach under the 
unfolded blade in nearly the same way that the current heavy weather attachment does.  
The design and installation could be greatly simplified by continued use of the strap to 
secure the unfolded blade, so the heavy weather support could be just a flat pad on a 
vertical pole, with no need for moving, locking jaws that are difficult and time consuming 
to install.  The blade would be secured by the pole underneath and the strap above.  The 
other advantage of this approach would be that the unfolded blade would not have to be 
released prior to application of the heavy weather attachment, rather, the heavy weather 
support could be pinned in place while the blade remained secured by the yellow strap.  It 
is possible that this approach would not meet the lateral load requirements that the main 
rotor will encounter in the 100 kt reverse flow wind condition, but as stated before, a 
limitation could be placed on the aircraft that would require hangar storage in winds of 
this magnitude.  This limitation would have minimal impact on the user and is prudent 
anyway. 
 
AUTOMATIC FOLDING 
A possible solution to the deficient blade fold system would have been, during 
initial aircraft development, to design an automatic folding rotor system.  Other shipboard 
aircraft have used automatic folding four (or more) bladed rotor systems for decades.  An 
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automatic folding system would have been expensive to implement, and would have 
carried an associated weight gain, but the benefits in shipboard suitability would have 
been great.  The aircraft would be able to support a greater operational tempo as a result 
of faster folding and unfolding cycles.  The aircraft would have required less support 
maintenance as a result of the reduced manpower required for folding and unfolding.  
Finally, an automatic folding rotor system would have reduced risk to aircraft and to 
personnel, because of the inherently dangerous blade folding procedure.   
ROTOR INDEXING MOTOR 
One way to partially implement automatic folding would be to incorporate a rotor 
indexing motor.  This motor could automatically or manually rotate the main rotor during 
the folding process.  This would eliminate the need for two of the flight deck personnel, 
speed up the process, and most importantly, would eliminate the risk of damage to the 
aircraft tail rotor.  It would also greatly speed the process of main rotor folding while still 
using the existing equipment.  The motor could be integrated into the rotor brake disc by 
interlocking on the disc shaft or by putting teeth around the outside of the rotor brake disc 
for a gear to turn the disc.  The motor could also be used to eliminate the RBLT and 
associated tools, if designed to lock the rotor brake in place once the fold cycle was 
complete. 
It is notable that this idea of a blade indexing motor is not original.  Other 
manufacturers have incorporated a similar design since the 1960s.  The idea for automatic 
indexing was proposed at preliminary design review of the H-1 Upgrades, and was 
rejected.  This idea would be inexpensive, simple to integrate, and would alleviate the 
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most serious of the folding deficiencies.  It could eliminate the need for two RBLTs per 
aircraft while still utilizing the current BFRs.  The current manual method could still be 
used as a backup in the event that the motor didn’t work properly. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the beginning, the H-1 Upgrades BFE was over-constrained by the list of 
requirements that the equipment was supposed to meet.   Without an automatic blade 
folding system, the aircraft SE was asked to compensate for the aircraft deficiency.  That, 
plus a limited budget, short schedule, and low priority inevitably resulted in a design 
which, in the opinion of the author, is neither effective nor suitable for introduction to the 
fleet. 
The true source of the problem was the lack of implementation of the folding 
mechanism into the main rotor, a problem that could have been corrected very early in 
the aircraft design process.  In order to meet the user requirements, the aircraft should 
have had an automatic folding system with a single, secure configuration to be used 
under all conditions, and a second set of equipment for air transportability.  This would 
have eliminated the need for moving parts on the BFE, and would have greatly reduced 
the total number of parts by only supporting one configuration, instead of three.  It would 
have also aided in rapid installation and removal of the racks by virtue of simplicity.  A 
folding rotor system would have also resulted in reduced manning requirements, reduced 
support equipment requirements, and a reduced aircraft logistical footprint.  
Unfortunately, because of priorities, once the problems with the BFE were identified, the 
program was already four years into a flight test program, and any change to the main 
rotor system would have required re-qualification of the entire flight envelope - a move 
 42 
that was deemed to be far too expensive and far too high risk for the program.  In 
addition, the program was under schedule and budget pressure from the beginning and 
therefore management was averse to major design changes if there was a potential work-
around available, which there seemed to be.  As a result, efforts to correct the deficiencies 
in the blade fold implementation concentrated on modifications to the support equipment, 
an approach that could never have corrected the root problem.   
The design requirements for the BFE limited the development process from the 
time when a manual folding rotor system was selected.  The only way that successful 
BFE could have been developed was for the program to reduce the requirements of the 
BFE, to be used in a limited set of environmental conditions or a limited set of 
configurations.  However, by forcing designers to plan for all conditions, even those that 
will be rarely or never encountered, the BFE that resulted was a set of equipment that was 
ineffective in everyday use.  Selection of a limited set of design requirements would have 
resulted in a simple, robust, and user-friendly design that would have met the vast 
majority of the desired conditions. 
The force required to fold was a major aircraft problem that could not be 
mitigated by changes to the support equipment.  Until an aircraft change is implemented 
that eliminates this problem, there will continue to be a risk of significant aircraft damage 
from unacceptable forces applied to the tail rotor.  A relatively easy way to solve this 
problem would be to incorporate a blade indexing motor that automatically turns the 
main rotor during folding evolutions.  The motor could be integrated easily by applying 
force to the rotor brake disc, either through teeth around the outside of the disc or by 
interlock to the disc shaft. 
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If the BFE had been designed for shipboard and land based storage only, and not 
for air transportability, the load requirements on the BFR would have been greatly 
reduced, both in the vertical and in the lateral direction.  This would have allowed a much 
lighter, simpler design to be implemented.  If the BFE was required to support only the 
normal weather configuration like other shipboard aircraft, the design could have been 
one piece, with a much simpler installation and fewer parts required.  And finally, if the 
main rotor were more robust so that the rotor blades did not have to move through the 
BFR, then the design would have been a very simple yet very secure clamp for the 
blades.  The combination of these three concessions would have resulted in a light, 
simple, robust, and reliable design that was easy and fast to install. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The H-1 Upgrades BFE is critical to program success.   The equipment affects the 
aircraft readiness, deployability, and suitability.  A simplified BFR design could greatly 
reduce the complexity of installation and decrease the time required for before and after 
flight maintenance, resulting in an increased operational tempo at no cost in manpower.  
In the author’s opinion, the H-1 Upgrades program should do the following: 
1. Redesign the H-1 Upgrades main rotor to incorporate an automatic folding 
rotor system. 
2. Redesign the blade fold racks for a reduced set of configurations, eliminating 
the air transportability and heavy weather configuration requirements for this set of 
equipment. 
3. Redesign the blade fold racks using a reduced load set. 
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4. Simplify the design of the heavy weather equipment to utilize the normal 
configuration equipment with an additional vertical brace. 
5. Consider changes to the main rotor system to allow the blades to be placed 
in the blade fold rack at the completion of the folding process, rather than at the 
beginning. 
6. Consider a simple, one-piece, clamping blade fold rack. 
7. Consider incorporation of an automatic blade indexing motor. 
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TABLE 1:  BFR 4 AND 5 DEFICIENCIES 
ISSUE 
NO. DEFICIENCY CORRECTIVE ACTION 
    
FFR-001 
/ #1 & 6 
& 28 & 
43 
The BFR attach fittings that mate to the 
A/C hoop fittings (ref. 449-030-156-103/-
104) exhibited an extremely tight fit during 
aircraft fit checks.  These fittings are 
present on both the left and right hand side 
of the aircraft.  Both fits with the aircraft 
were tight. 
Slightly modify the tolerance of the BFR 
fittings to provide a tiny bit more clearance.  
Additionally, surface finish will be removed on 
the BP from the lower region of the part.  The 
existing parts are 17-4PH, and are corrosion 
resistant. 
FFR-002 
/ #29 
The BFR attach fitting that mates to the 
A/C clevis fitting (ref. 449-030-160-103) 
exhibited an extremely tight fit during 
aircraft fit checks.  The fitting mates into a 
clevis fitting on the aircraft that has over 
time, had lots of paint build-up.  The fitting 
on the BFR is designed to fill the width of 
the clevis, generating a nice solid fit.  
Minimal play in the fitting is desired during 
loading of the rack in the fore/aft direction.  
Slightly modify the tolerance of the BFR 
fitting to provide a tiny bit more clearance. 
FFR-003 
/ #3 
Three different assemblies that possess 
telescoping features on the BFR have a soft 
captivation method that appears to be 
insufficient.  The assemblies have a spring-
loaded ball detent that, if telescoped too far, 
engages a hole in the outer tube and 
prevents the tube from dropping out of the 
assembly.  During the design phase, 
stainless steel ball detents were selected for 
their corrosion preventative characteristics.  
However, during the assembly phase of 
BFRs CK001, CK002, and CK003, it was 
noted that these stainless steel detent balls 
were scoring the interior surfaces of the 
tubes they were mounted into.  As a result, 
the detents were threaded down into their 
housing to reduce this condition.  The 
captivation effectiveness was affected as a 
result during the functional testing.  Fast 
tube extraction yields inadequate 
captivation. 
Switch the spring loaded ball detents to 
acetyl, and adjust to proper height per drawing 
requirements.  The scoring problem will be 
corrected through a material change, and the 
tube captivation effectiveness will be increased 
as a result of properly adjusting the spring 
plungers to the correct height. 
FFR-004 
/ #4 & 5 
& 50 
The telescoping features on the strut 
assemblies of both the forward rack and the 
aft rack seem to bind during adjustment.  
The inner tube of the extended blade 
support assembly also requires a better wear 
surface due to repeated plunging during 
adjustment.  
Provide supplemental acetyl wear surfaces, 
where applicable.  Hard anodize inner tube 
surfaces to provide better wear surface 
characteristics. 
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ISSUE 
NO. DEFICIENCY CORRECTIVE ACTION 
 
FFR-005 
/ #7 
The strongback assembly of both the 
forward rack and the aft rack should possess 
knurling in the region of common hand-
hold areas. 
Add non-skid tape to required regions.  
Knurling cannot be accomplished on existing 
units, therefore non-skid tape applied to the 
region will provide the required grip.   
 
 
 
FFR-006 
/ #8 
The jacking pole contains a swivel 
assembly that interfaces the blade-handling 
pole.  This interface is designed to allow an 
operator to install or remove the BFR 
system from either the aft or forward 
position, on either aircraft.  The swivel 
interface is difficult engage when the BFR, 
(fore or aft) is already installed onto the 
aircraft. 
Encourage BFR operators to practice using 
this method.  This tool feature was under 
utilized during the functional testing.  More 
practice by operators may reveal that the 
functionality of the swivel is adequate.  
Therefore, no rework unless additional 
information comes out of sea trials. 
FFR-007 
/ #12 
The swaged ball cable assembly that 
resides at the outboard end of the folding 
blade clamp assembly binds slightly when 
adjusted to/from the different available 
positions.  The swaged balls bind in the root 
of the “butterfly” fitting located on the end 
of the lower arm of the folding blade clamp.
Modify the dimensions of the butterfly fitting 
so that the swaged ball cable assembly can slip 
into position a little easier.  Consideration will 
have to be given to the overall stability of the 
design.  In other words, the stability of the 
swaged ball in the butterfly fitting, once the arm 
is in the capture or secure positions should not 
be compromised to facilitate easier installation. 
FFR-008 
/ #13 
Strap storage for the folding blade strap 
throw-over. The current design does not 
have a storage location for the straps.  The 
straps are very long, and easily become 
entangled around objects and people when 
left un-stored. 
Allow the customer to continue using the 
assembly in the current design, and possibly 
develop a recommendation for improvement 
based on a record of experience after sea 
trials. 
FFR-009 
/ #19 & 
27 & 38 
& 56 
The throw-over portion of the extended 
blade strap seems marginally long.  The 
throw-over process requires a longer piece 
of lead material because the strap itself is 
too heavy, and presents too much 
“windage” in a shipboard environment to 
throw over repeatedly.  In addition, the 
overall length of the load carrying portion 
of the strap was too long to effectively 
restrain the blade. 
 
Another design suggestion from the 
customer included modifying the length of 
the extension portion of the strap to allow 
operator to walk the strap over the tip of the 
blade.  This is not recommended because 
damage to the trim tabs could occur with 
the strap in close proximity during this type 
of procedure. 
Lengthen the piece of throw over strap used 
to facilitate the transfer of the extended blade 
strap from one side of the blade to the other.   
FFR-010 
/ #17 
The extended blade strap support had 
problems feeding its way over the trailing 
edge of the extended blade once thrown 
over the top.  The width variations provide 
edges that snag on the trailing edge. 
Provide a modified design that tapers and 
transitions from one width to another, allowing 
for better pull over of the strap across the 
trailing edge. 
TABLE 1: CONTINUED 
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ISSUE 
NO. DEFICIENCY CORRECTIVE ACTION 
 
 
FFR-011 
/ #18 
 
The lead weight of the extended blade 
strap support is too large in diameter.  It 
presents a dent risk in its current 
configuration. 
Redesign the lead weight with a portion of 
rubber, (i.e. rubber ball, rubber tube) consisting 
of the same weight, that could be thrown over in 
lieu of a bag of lead shot.  This presents a 
reduced risk of FOD, and potentially less 
damage to the aircraft blades during throw-over.
FFR-012 
/ #20 
The inner tube of the extended blade 
support structure exhibits too much free 
movement with respect to the outer tube of 
the extended blade support structure. 
Increase the dimensions of the aluminum 
wear pads by just enough to consume excessive 
play.  Add additional acetyl wear pads that 
extend along the length of the tube, so that the 
wear surfaces are acetyl, and the bearing 
surfaces remain aluminum in those regions that 
require them. 
FFR-013 
/ #21 & 
31 
Rotor brake does not fit into the required 
envelope. 
Redesign the rotor brake tool to properly fit 
and function within the given envelope. 
FFR-014 
/ #65 
The NORCO pins do not store into the 
storage utility belt bolted to the base of the 
strongback assembly. 
Hard anodize the piece parts, and verify holes 
will accept the current design of the NORCO 
pins. 
FFR-015 
/ #22 The forward strongback fouled the TSS. 
Redesign the strongback, (ref. HD-100020) to 
allow for a modified height of the lower cross 
tube.  (Note:  Commonality between aft and 
forward strongbacks drives a small change 
will have to result in the aft third strut to 
maintain proper fit with aft rack).  
FFR-016 
/ #24 & 
52 
Clearance of the forward third strut joint 
structure with the AH-1Z canopy in the 
extended position.  Inadequate overlap 
between the lower inner tube and the outer 
tube add to this concern. 
Modifications of the lower translating joint to 
prevent excessive play during inboard loading.  
This would entail making the interface a little 
more of a lap joint, instead of the limited 
overlap currently designed.  Replace the 
protruding heads of the fastener collar with a 
riveted joint that could be shaved flush, 
providing less potential of damage in the event 
that contact occurs. 
FFR-017 
/ #25 & 
26 
The engagement of the upper folding 
blade clamp arm into the lower folding 
blade clamp arm is inadequate.  When 
positioned in the capture mode, the upper 
arm does not engage the lower arm 
sufficiently to transfer folding loads in the 
lower arm of the folding blade clamp. 
Redesign the lower arm to allow for more 
interaction between the tip of the upper arm and 
the end of the lower arm on the folding blade 
clamp during capture configuration. 
FFR-018 
/ #30 
Flex shaft extension arm sticks beyond 
the top of the strongback assembly. 
Leave current assembly as is.  The assembly 
itself may be removed from the rack, and 
replaced by a more common hand tool, 
therefore rework to alleviate this condition 
would be dependent on whether or not the 
extension arm stays on the assembly at all. 
(Human Factors Issue) 
TABLE 1: CONTINUED 
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ISSUE 
NO. DEFICIENCY CORRECTIVE ACTION 
 
 
FFR-019 
/ #32 The design of the HD-100021-101 fitting and the mating fitting on HD-1000031 may 
foster the ‘spin-out’ of the bushings.   
A modification of the design might be 
required based on the results of the 
investigation.  Pictures and other data from the 
functional test will be used to evaluate if the 
bushings were in fact installed prior to 
functional testing.  If no design errors are 
revealed, then the design will remain 
unchanged. 
 
FFR-
020/ #33 
The jack lockout key has a design error 
that prevents the key from being locked out 
because it is too long by .200 inches.  
Modify the applicable dimension to allow 
proper fit.   
FFR-021 
The lockout arm is susceptible to damage 
during non-use.  This is the jack lockout 
arm that is used to secure the jack lockout 
key.  This system is used to prevent 
downward jack drift during periods of non-
use in the loaded condition. 
Change the material and design to provide a 
more substantial assembly capable of more 
abuse. 
FFR-022 
/ #67 
Painted surfaces of the tool are subject to 
repeated wear, partly because the tool will 
see such frequent use, and also because tool 
is not stored in a case or other protective 
storage media. 
Investigate the possibility of powder coating 
the assembly to provide a more wear resistant 
finish for components of the BFR seeing contact 
with the ground.  Not all components of the 
BFR may be candidates for powder coating, 
partly because of the heat required to cure the 
finish onto the parts.  Many of the BFR welded 
assemblies are aged only at 350 degrees F.  If 
the powder coating temperature is higher, or 
similar, it may have detrimental affects to the 
strength.  Other detriments include warpage.  If 
powder coating proves to be unavailable for our 
applications, then the default will be to continue 
using the same finishing specifications used by 
all other H-1 Upgrade SE. 
FFR-023 
/ #68 
ID of the round tube on the welded 
assembly has an inadequate wear surface. 
Modify drawing requirements to selectively 
hard anodize ID of HD-100020-301.  The 
proposed solution has a $500.00 impact per 
strongback. 
FFR-024 
/ #35 & 
37 
Upper arm flexibility during fold is 
unacceptable.  The folding loads produced 
some unexpected deflections.  These 
deflections may be the result of a optical 
illusion resulting from the spring in the end 
of the folding blade clamp to stack, thus 
resulting in rotation about the main hinge 
point of the folding blade clamp upper arm.. 
This rotation could be falsely perceived as 
deflection.  A design investigation will 
reveal whether this is the case or not. 
Redesign upper arm of folding blade clamp to 
provide additional rigidity during folding loads.  
A re-evaluation of folding loads will be 
conducted to validate folding loads that were 
experienced during testing. 
TABLE 1: CONTINUED 
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FFR-025 
/ #36 
Lower arm flexibility enhances difficulty 
during adjustment of folding blade clamp 
assembly from capture mode to secure 
mode. 
Modify the existing design to provide more 
rigidity during adjustment between 
configurations.  
FFR-026 
/ #69 
The roller of the folding blade clamp 
needs to be more substantial.  The roller 
material is currently a little too pliable for 
the loads that are exerted onto it during a 
fold/unfold. 
Redesign the roller to incorporate a new 
material(s), less likely to gouge during 
fold/unfold with the trailing edge bearing up 
against it.  The material selection need to also 
be sensitive to the trailing edge. 
 
FFR-027 
/ #70 
The upper inboard pin on the extended 
blade support clamp binds during pin 
extraction.  The pin currently locates itself 
through three close tolerance bushed holes. 
Redesign to loosen the tolerances of the ream 
on the bushed hole to alleviate condition.   
FFR-028 
/ #44 & 
45 & 71 
The GF-100024-1010 assemblies were 
not used.  Capt. Abate requested that the 
assemblies go away.  During functional 
testing, Snap-On extension handles were 
used in lieu of the designed extension arm 
with no detriment to performance.  
Remove and replace the designed extension 
arm with an off-the-shelf Snap-On 3/8” drive 
that can be stored on the rack in a similar 
position.  The off-the-shelf component will have 
to be assigned a dash number and be made into 
a “make from” assembly.  Without this, 
provisions cannot easily be made on the rack to 
store the Snap-On component.  
FFR-029 
/ #42 & 
48 
Redesign of the extended blade support 
structure to allow for installation from the 
ground.  Captain Abate requested a 
complete redesign of the extended blade 
support structure to allow for its installation 
from the ground. 
This is considered a new design requirement.  
Discussion with the customer about use of 
ladders and stands to position this component of 
the BFR on onto the rack after aircraft has been 
moved to off-spot.  No redesign until further 
evaluation of requirements has been 
conducted with customer. 
FFR-030 
/ #51 
The separation of the dogleg fitting from 
the aft NORCO pin.  The captivation 
method of the dogleg fitting on the forward 
third strut has been questioned by a couple 
of operators.  Some feel that the current 
configuration presents a small risk of 
damaging the aircraft during installation 
into the aircraft fitting. 
Continue to install the rack using the current 
design.  More definitive results with regards 
to this concern will be obtained upon 
completion of sea trials. 
FFR-
031/ #53 
& 57 & 
72 
The jack lockout feature is a two-piece 
operation.  The current design uses a two-
piece design to effectively lock out the 
potential downward drift of the jacking pole 
actuator during long term positioning in the 
loaded condition. 
Continue to use the current design.  Make 
more informed decisions about the design 
and possibly its applicability after sea trials.  
It may turn out that the actuator design will not 
sufficiently drift even in the unlocked condition 
to warrant the lockout device.  
TABLE 1: CONTINUED 
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FFR-032 
/ #54 
Marking – Marking was left off of the 
functional test units to allow for real time 
assessment of marking locations during the 
functional test.  Several recommendations 
were given to help operators use the BFR 
system more efficiently.  Some of the 
recommendations are as follows: 
 
     1.  Mark the strongback to help indicate 
the position of the extended blade during a 
shipboard fold.· Mark each jacking pole 
assembly with large letters indicating 
whether it is a forward jacking pole or an 
aft jacking pole. 
Change design to mark with painted labels. 
FFR-033 
/ #15 & 
16 & 47 
& 55 
The lower arm comes into close 
proximity of the lower surface of the blade 
during blade approach.  The actual 
clearance as measured during the functional 
fold test was about 2 inches.  This clearance 
my not be adequate in a shipboard 
environment.  Additionally, if procedurally 
the blade is allowed to drop out of the 
folding blade clamp, a potential exists to 
damage the underside of the blade when the 
blade contacts the lower arm of the folding 
blade clamp. 
Redesign to provide a buffer surface that will 
protect the blade in the event of contact between 
the blade and the lower arm of the folding blade 
clamp. 
FFR-034 
The interface of the blade-handling pole 
to the swivel assembly provide for an 
awkward interface due to the length of the 
pole while installing/removing onto/from 
aircraft. 
No action until further data can be 
obtained after sea trials. 
FFR-035 
The interface of the blade-handling pole 
to the swivel assembly provide for an 
awkward interface due to the length of the 
pole while installing/removing onto/from 
aircraft. 
No action until further data can be 
obtained after sea trials. 
FFR-036 
/ #9 & 
10 & 11 
& 49 
The design of the blade handling pole 
head should be optimized to reduce weight 
and complexity.  
Redesign the head of the blade handling pole 
to reduce weight, and complexity. 
FFR-037 
/ #63 
The interface of the blade-handling pole 
needs a non-slip surface for better grip 
during blade control. 
Redesign to accommodate mixing grit into 
the paint for that region of the tube.  This would 
allow for less machining, more strength, and 
less weight than the knurling option.  Also, 
rework to existing units could be accomplished 
that would match the production design change. 
TABLE 1: CONTINUED 
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FFR-038 
The extended blade lockout interface was 
very cumbersome to use.  It relies very 
heavily on blade position, and should be re-
evaluated.  The current design relies on 
springs, and over-center mechanisms that 
are overly complicated for the application 
they serve. 
Redesign the interface to utilize a limited 
adjustable rigid system in lieu of over-center 
mechanism. 
aircraft 
#1 / #2 
Deflection of the A/C fitting and local skin 
was noted during aft BFR install (None to date.) 
aircraft 
#2 / 61 
& 62 & 
64 
Air Transport configuration; change to 
removing the blades??  Maj. wants to know. 
Chris for action 
(None to date.) 
FFR - / 
#39 
issue with very loose parts during 
installation of extended blade support - -
extended blade clamp had been unpinned on 
the ground, and was fully broken down into 
its most ‘open’ configuration prior to 
loading  COULD BE INCORPORATED 
INTO FFR-019 
lower, upper, and diagonal arm.  Issue with 
loose arms hitting people as it is installed. TBD 
on proposed fix. 
 
FFR- / 
#40 
required additional personnel to support the 
extended blade itself during the installation 
of this gear 
procedural or if after sea trials we need to lower 
the clamp to accommodate the blade droop.  
Basic question is what will be the elevation of 
the production fixed blade be? 
FFR- / 
#41 
issue with the upper arm pad punching a 
hole in the top of the blade. - upper arm was 
rotated over into position 
(None to date.) 
aircraft 
#3 / #34 
& 46 & 
58 & 59 
& 60 
excessive force required to initiate fold - 
excessive force on tail rotor (None to date.) 
FFR- / 
#14 
The internal stop of the actuator design 
needs to be reviewed for its robustness. 
Chris will look into this with manufacturer to 
make sure that the stop can tolerate the loads. 
TABLE 1: CONTINUED 
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TABLE 2:  SEA TRIALS BLADE FOLD ISSUES 
DEFICIENCY DISCUSSION 
Inadequate blade retention of the Blade 
Handling Pole (Crutch Pole) 
Although in ideal conditions the retention straps will engage 
the end of the blade tip, in normal conditions the straps tend 
to get out of position with the slightest misalignment of the 
Pole or wind condition. A large hole meshed sock would 
improve the design. 
The requirement for the B-4 stand on the 
flight deck for the installation of the 
Extended Blade Support Assembly (Heavy 
Weather Rack) is not required so long 
shipboard compatible ladders are identified 
for that function. 
Pub issue.  Eliminate the reference to the B-4 stand for the 
installation of the heavy weather rack. Identify ladders 
similar to the V-22 Little Giant Ladders with tie down 
rings. 
Inadequate design of quick release pin 
installation. 
A global review of the pin insertion tolerances needs to be 
done.  The excessive operator compensation required to 
assemble the BFR is unacceptable. Although the loads need 
to be addressed in the design, the capability to insert the 
pins in a darkened ship environment is essential. 
Inadequate design of Aft Rack telescopic 
Strut Assembly 
Initial discussions were in the direction of deleting the 
telescopic capability.  As the discussion continued, the ability 
to stow the strut in a less susceptible configuration was found 
to be a better.  The relocation of the procedural step that 
extends the strut to a location prior to the installation of 
the rack on the aircraft should improve the installation 
issue.  
Inadequate design of Aft Rack telescopic 
Strut Assembly 
The inner tube of the extended blade support structure 
exhibits too much free movement with respect to the outer 
tube of the extended blade support structure. Investigate 
increasing the overlap length within the interface to 
improve the condition. 
Inadequate design of the Forward and Aft 
folding blade clamp rollers 
Although the material was changed to improve the condition, 
the new material continues to degrade within very few folds. 
Investigate a new design approach to eliminate the 
degradation of the blade retention device. Is a roller 
required?  Would a Delryn pad be adequate without 
degrading the trailing edge of the blade. 
Inadequate design of the folding blade 
(throw over) strap. 
Initial discussions were in the direction of lengthening or 
changing the configuration somehow to improve the ability of 
the crew to get the strap over the blade.  As the discussion 
continued, most agreed that crew proficiency and possible 
local mods would eliminate this issue.  
Inadequate design of the fixed blade (throw 
over) strap. 
Lengthen or change the configuration somehow to improve 
the ability of the crew to get the strap over the blade.  
Investigate lengthening the strap as a solution. 
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Inadequate design of the fixed blade (throw 
over) strap. 
The extended blade strap support had problems feeding its 
way over the trailing edge of the extended blade once thrown 
over the top.  The width variations provide edges that snag on 
the trailing edge.  Although the transition has been improved, 
there continues to be snag issues with the design.  Improving 
the transience will eliminate this issue. 
Inadequate retention of the Forward and Aft 
Rack speed handle 
Depending on the condition of the speed handle and the 
manufacturer, the speed handle retention ring that retains the 
handle of the speed handle can be too restrictive to allow the 
handle to be easily removed. Investigate moving the 
retaining ring an additional .5 inches upward. 
Unnecessary component on the Forward and 
Aft Jacking Poles 
The Blade guard installed on the top clamp of the Forward 
and Aft Jacking Pole Assembly has no purpose.  Although the 
design was driven by information on the rotor system that 
proved conservative, the actual movement of the blades do 
not seem to require the guard.  Investigate the possibility of 
removing the guard and adding protective material to the 
blade side of the upper clamp. 
Component on the Forward and Aft Jacking 
Poles interferes with the installation of the 
heavy weather rack 
When the upper arm (in the extended position) on the heavy 
weather rack is placed over the non folding rack the arm 
contacts the Blade Guard. The design was forced to have a 
telescopic capability on the arm to allow the arm to clear the 
Blade Guard. Investigate the elimination of the guard and 
the removal of the telescoping component on the upper 
arm. 
Unnecessary lower clamping position on the 
Forward and Aft Jacking Pole. 
The lower clamp arm on the Forward and Aft Jacking Pole 
has two positions; Normal and Heavy Weather.  During folds 
at Sea Trials, the Heavy Weather position was used during the 
first fold and was never placed back in the Normal position 
throughout Sea Trials.  Investigate the removal of the two 
position capability on the lower arm. 
Inadequate blade protection on the forward 
and aft heavy weather rack. 
During the installation of the forward and aft heavy weather 
rack, if the blade is positioned incorrectly, the blade can 
contact metal surfaces on the lower arm.  Investigate the 
application of a larger Delryn pad to adequately protect 
the blade during the installation of the heavy weather 
rack. 
Over-complex design of the heavy weather 
rack. 
With the issues associated with the installation of the pins, the 
use of ladders to install, and the somewhat uncontrolled 
placement of the upper clamp over the non-folding blade, 
there is a desire to simplify the design of the rack.  During 
Sea Trials, H-60 aircraft secured their blades with a clamp 
device that seemed considerably easier to use.  Investigate 
the possibility of using a clamp style blade interface on the 
heavy weather rack. 
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Inadequate handles on the Blade Handling 
Pole (crutch pole).  
Although the conditions during Sea Trials were considered 
moderate, there was an instance that the man on the crutch 
pole lost his grip on the pole. During degraded weather the 
opportunity to loose control of the crutch pole is increased 
significantly due to the lack of any high friction surface to 
hold the pole.  Investigate the application of grip tape or 
some other high friction surface on the handling areas of 
the pole. 
Excessive weight of the Blade Handling 
Pole (crutch pole). 
During Sea Trials personnel noted that there was significant 
effort applied to getting the crutch pole in place and 
managing while it was in place.  Investigate a weight 
reduction program for the crutch pole, possibly a design 
similar to the H-60 clamp. 
Lack of data associated with the optimum 
elevation of the blade for the least force to 
fold the blades 
Although the additional pole attached to the crutch pole 
allowed for the movement of the rotor system during fold, the 
forces were still in the 80 pound range. During a test at Pax, 
there was a test that demonstrated that the pivot pin was 
significantly relieved when the blade was extended another 
4.5 inches past the maximum elevation of the Jacking Pole 
blade clamp.  Although this does not categorically indicate 
that the binding in the joint is relieved when the blade is lifted 
past the maximum reach of the BFR, it is certainly worth 
investigating a better elevation for the blade during folding to 
reduce the force to fold. Investigate the binding loads of the 
pivot joint at various blade elevations. 
Excessive turns required to raise the 
Forward and Aft Jacking Poles. 
The Aft Jacking pole requires 82 revolutions to raise the 
blade clamp to the maximum elevation.  The Forward Jacking 
Pole requires a similar amount. The crews that folded during 
Sea Trials all commented that the time it took to raise the 
Jacking Pole was excessive and that the force to raise could 
be considerably more.  Investigate the use of a lower gear 
ratio on the Jacking Pole raising mechanism. 
Inadequate 3d strut NORCO Pin Assembly 
storage. 
The mechanism to secure the 3d strut NORCO Pin Assembly 
inadequately retains the assembly.  The NORCO Pin does not 
freely install into the pin holes and the retaining mechanism 
for the other end of the Assembly allows the end to become 
loose. 
Unnecessary telescoping section on the 
Forward Stongback. 
During operations at Sea Trials it was noted that the 
telescoping capability on the Forward Strongback that allows 
the crew to attach the 3d strut when the Strongback is at 45 
degree orientation was not used.  When asked if it was a 
capability that could be used in some situations, the answer 
was that it was not necessary.  Investigate the elimination of 
the telescopic capability and use the newly available 
length of square tubing to stiffen the joint on the required 
telescoping section (AH-1Z to/from UH-1Y 
configurations) by create a longer overlap . 
Inadequate design of the Rotor Brake Tool. 
Rotor Brake Tool is difficult to install in both aircraft.  With 
the ship motion, the port installation on the UH-1Y is 
particularly dangerous for personnel climbing on the aircraft.  
Investigate the actual requirement for the rotor brake and 
if it is still required make it easier to install. 
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Inadequate protection for the non-folding 
blade on the Jacking Pole. 
In the event that a non-folding blade is rotated too far and the 
blade contacts the rack, there are no provisions for protecting 
the trailing edge of the blade. Especially during darkened 
ship, there is a considerable possibility that the blade can 
contact the rack.  Investigate the addition of a protective 
surface to prevent damage to the blade. 
Lack of adequate marking on the telescoping 
components. 
During the operation of telescoping the 3d struts it is very 
easy to go past the pinning hole, especially during a darkened 
ship condition. Although loosening the hole tolerances will 
help, a visual indicator that is readily visible with NVG 
compatible lights will make the operation significantly easier. 
Investigate the marking of the hole positions with NVG 
compatible markings. 
 
 
TABLE 2: CONTINUED 
 60 
VITA 
Matthew Funk was born in Virginia and raised in Virginia, North Carolina, and 
Ohio.  He graduated from Olmsted Falls High School in Olmsted Falls, OH, in 1994.  
Upon graduating from Ohio University with a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical 
Engineering and a Minor in Mathematics in November 1998, he came to work at the 
Patuxent River NAS in January 1999.   He worked for the Ship Suitability, Rotary Wing 
branch and was selected to attend the United States Naval Test Pilot School in Patuxent 
River, Maryland.  Upon graduating from the United States Naval Test Pilot School in 
2002, he was soon assigned to the H-1 Upgrades program as the Ship Suitability lead 
engineer.  As his time passed with H-1 Upgrades, he was additionally assigned to be the 
lead engineer for IMC certification, Structural Demonstration, and Height-Velocity 
envelope development.  In December 2005 he was selected as the Lead Test Engineer for 
the H-1 Upgrades Program.  As the H-1 Upgrades flight test program wound down, in 
May 2006 Mr. Funk was re-assigned as the Lead Test Engineer for the Naval Unmanned 
Combat Aerial System, where he continues to work today. 
